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State Liability: In Search of a Dividing Line between 








When Member States violate Community law and affected 
persons bring a claim for damages, at first glance, there seems to be a clear and 
simple division of tasks between Community law and the ECJ on the one hand 
and national law and national courts on the other.
It is a principle of Community law that the Member States are obliged to 
make good losses and damages caused to individuals by breaches of Community 
law for which they can be held responsible. And it is for the national legal order 
to designate the competent courts and lay down the procedural rules for the 
relevant legal proceedings.
Indeed, a clear and simple division of tasks and competences. But is that 
really the case? Is it always easy to establish when Community law is involved 
and what is left to national law? And what is, by the way, the rationale behind 
this division of tasks. 
 2 The existence of state liability as a matter of principle
In Francovich, the ECJ ruled ‘that it is a principle of Community 
law that the Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage caused to 
individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held respon-
sible’ (paragraph 37; emphasis added by JHJ). What reasons did the ECJ give in 
establishing such a European-based state liability? Why did the Court feel it nec-
essary to depart from its earlier case law? In 1976 the Court of Justice decided 
in Russo that the state’s liability for infringements of Community law was still a 
matter for national law.2 
The basis for this liability was primarily found in Article 10 EC, under which 
the Member States are required to exercise their powers in accordance with 
Community law and in a spirit of Community loyalty. In Francovich, the Court 
stated that the principle of full effectiveness of Community law and the require-
ment of effective judicial protection must be regarded as the cornerstones of 
state liability under Community law. The principle of state liability, the Court 
stated, is inherent in the system of the Treaty:
‘The existence of State liability as a matter of principle 
31 It should be borne in mind at the outset that the EEC Treaty has created its 
own legal system, which is integrated into the legal systems of the Member States 
and which their courts are bound to apply. The subjects of that legal system are 
not only the Member States but also their nationals. Just as it imposes burdens on 
1  Jan H. Jans; University of Groningen. This chapter builds upon parts of chapter VIII of Jans, J.H., R. de 
Lange, A. Prechal and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, Europeanisation of Public Law (Europa Law Publishing, 
Groningen 2007).
2 Case 60/75 Russo [1976] ECR 45.
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indiiduals, Community law is also intended to gie rise to rights which become 
part of their legal patrimony. Those rights arise not only where they are expressly 
granted by the Treaty but also by irtue of obligations which the Treaty imposes in 
a clearly defined manner both on indiiduals and on the Member States and the 
Community institutions (see the judgments in Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] 
ECR 1 and Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585). 
32 Furthermore, it has been consistently held that the national courts whose 
task it is to apply the proisions of Community law in areas within their jurisdic-
tion must ensure that those rules take full effect and must protect the rights 
which they confer on indiiduals (see in particular the judgments in Case 106/77 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 
16, and Case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 19). 
33 The full effectieness of Community rules would be impaired and the protec-
tion of the rights which they grant would be weakened if indiiduals were unable 
to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for 
which a Member State can be held responsible. 
34 The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly 
indispensable where, as in this case, the full effectieness of Community rules is 
subject to prior action on the part of the State and where, consequently, in the 
absence of such action, indiiduals cannot enforce before the national courts the 
rights conferred upon them by Community law. 
35 It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss and 
damage caused to indiiduals as a result of breaches of Community law for which 
the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty. 
36 A further basis for the obligation of Member States to make good such loss 
and damage is to be found in Article 5 of the Treaty, under which the Member 
States are required to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, 
to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under Community law. Among these is 
the obligation to nullify the unlawful consequences of a breach of Community law 
(see, in relation to the analogous proision of Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty, the 
judgment in Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgium [1960] ECR 559). 
37 It follows from all the foregoing that it is a principle of Community law that 
the Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage caused to indiidu-
als by breaches of Community law for which they can be held responsible.’
In Francovich, the Court of Justice made it clear that state liability was deter-
mined first and foremost by Community law.3 The basis for this liability was 
primarily found in Article 10 EC, under which the Member States are required 
to exercise their powers in accordance with Community law and in a spirit of 
Community loyalty. In Francovich, the Court stated that the principle of full 
effectiveness of Community law and the requirement of effective judicial protec-
tion must be regarded as the cornerstones of state liability under Community 




law. The principle of state liability, the Court stated, is inherent in the system of 
the Treaty. 
National law questioning the doctrine of Francovich-liability ‘as such’ can 
not be accepted.4 It is the author’s opinion that there is no room at all for the 
Member States to limit the scope of liability, for instance, by excluding certain 
measures/actions of the national judiciary and/or the constitutional legislator. 
In the early days, national courts only occasionally gave judgments which 
ignored Francovich liability. 
In Greece, a judgment has been reported concerning the defectie transposal of 
Directie 89/48. The Council of State (Symvoulio tis Epikrateias) did not comment 
on the problems of Francovich, een though the appellant had pleaded the liability 
of the State on account of the defectie transposal.5 While recognising the obliga-
tion on the State to transpose the Directie, the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias found 
that it is for the legislature and the executie to choose the appropriate legal 
means of fulfilling that obligation and concludes that the courts hae no jurisdic-
tion to interene in the matter, especially by acknowledging the ciil liability of the 
State for the infringement of its Community obligations.
Recently, the ECJ was confronted with Italian legislation, which excluded all 
state liability for damage caused to individuals by an infringement of Commu-
nity law committed by a national court adjudicating at last instance, where 
that infringement is the result of an interpretation of provisions of law or of an 
assessment of the facts and evidence carried out by that court.6 The ECJ made it 
very clear that this was unacceptable:
‘[…] to exclude all State liability in such circumstances on the ground that the 
infringement of Community law arises from an interpretation of proisions of law 
made by a court would be tantamount to rendering meaningless the principle laid 
down by the Court in the Köbler judgment. […]’
A potential problem for the future is caused by critical case law of some national 
constitutional courts regarding the question of supremacy of European law, in 
4  With respect to the doctrine of direct effect the same can, and has been, said; cf. Jans, J.H., and J.M. 
Prinssen, ‘Direct Effect: Convergence or Divergence? A Comparative Perspective’ in Prinssen, J. M. 
and A. Schrauwen (eds.) Direct Effect; Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine (Europa Law Publishing, 
Groningen 2002) at pp. 105-126.
5  Greek Symvoulio tis Epikrateias, plenary session, 26 February 1999, Deltio Forologikis Nomothesias, 
1999, 1783-1787; EDDDD, 2000, 98-104; EuroCL 2000, Part 6, No. 75 (summary in English). Reported 
in Commission of the European Communities ‘XVIIIth Report on Monitoring the Application of 
Community Law’ COM(2001) 309.
6  Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo [2006] ECR I-5177. Cf. also Case C-470/03 A.G.M.-COS.MET 
Srl, Judgment of 17 April 2007, n.y.r. in the ECR.
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particular, with respect to the national constitution.7 In line with this case law it 
cannot be ruled out that national courts will have some problems with respect to 
accepting state liability, if and when the infringement is caused by the national 
constitution. 
The same kind of problems can be expected with respect to liability for 
infringements of EU third pillar law. From the judgment of the ECJ in Pupino, 
it emerges that the principle of loyal cooperation is also binding in the area of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.8 The Court concluded in 
this case that the national court is required to interpret national law as far as 
possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the framework decisions 
concerning criminal cooperation in the third pillar. Therefore, it could be 
argued that state liability, even though developed in the first pillar, also applies 
to acts of Member States in contravention of the obligations under the third 
pillar. However, in Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, in its remarkable 
judgment on the European Arrest Warrant clearly has a different view on the 
consequences of third pillar law for the domestic legal order.9 In the light of this 
judgment it is difficult to see how the Bundesverfassungsgericht could accept, as 
a matter of European law, that infringements of state authorities of third pillar 
obligations result in liability to pay damages.
Future developments on these issues must be watched closely to see whether 
this proves to be the case.
 3 Setting the conditions for Francovich-liability
 3.1 Liability under more stringent conditions 
Not only is the principle of state liability exclusively a matter of 
European law, the same can be said with respect to the three conditions of state 
liability: sufficiently serious breach, rights for individuals, causality between the 
breach of the obligation and the damage sustained. The reasons for that can be 
found in Brasserie. On the question if reparation can be made dependant of the 
existence of a on national law based principle of ‘fault’, the Court ruled:
‘79 The obligation to make reparation for loss or damage caused to indiiduals 
cannot, howeer, depend upon a condition based on any concept of fault going 
beyond that of a sufficiently serious breach of Community law. Imposition of such 
a supplementary condition would be tantamount to calling in question the right to 
reparation founded on the Community legal order.’
7  Cf. also the contributions of J.M. Prinssen and N. Lavranos to this volume.
8  Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
9  European Arrest Warrant Act [2005] 2 BvR 2236/04. Cf. also the contributions of J.M. Prinssen and N. 




Imposing supplementary conditions by national law cannot be accepted, as 
this would call the right to reparation itself in question. This line of reasoning 
was also followed by the Court in Traghetti del Mediterraneo already mentioned 
above.10 Italian law limited state liability for an infringement of Community law 
attributable to a national court adjudicating at last instance solely to cases of 
intentional fault and serious misconduct on the part of the court. The ECJ did 
not accept this either:
‘Accordingly, although it remains possible for national law to define the criteria 
relating to the nature or degree of the infringement which must be met before 
state liability can be incurred for an infringement of Community law attributable 
to a national court adjudicating at last instance, under no circumstances may such 
criteria impose requirements stricter than that of a manifest infringement of the 
applicable law, as set out in paragraphs 53 to 56 of the Köbler judgment.’
 3.2 Lowering the standards for liability
So, raising the standards for liability by reference to conditions 
based on national law, which goes beyond the three European conditions, is not 
acceptable. But what about lowering the standards? Once again a parallel can 
be drawn with the doctrine of direct effect.11 Provisions of Community law are 
directly effective if they pass the threshold of ‘unconditional and sufficiently pre-
cise’. Raising this threshold by national law/courts cannot be accepted; lowering 
this threshold can be allowed. 
In Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, the Court of Justice made it clear 
that Francovich liability implies a form of case-law driven minimum harmonisa-
tion. If Member States wish to operate a ‘more far-reaching’ system of liability, 
they are free to do so, though their freedom is in turn limited by the obligation 
of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC.12 This is above all relevant 
to countries such as the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium. Generally speaking, 
the system of state liability in these countries is more generous – in the sense 
that unlawful action by the state more readily gives rise to liability – than the 
European system.
In a Belgian case (concerning technical rules applied contrary to Article 28 
EC), the Cour de Cassation (Court of Cassation) set aside the judgment of the 
lower court, holding that the acts of the administrative authority were to be 
10  Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo [2006] ECR I-5177. Cf. also Case C-470/03 A.G.M.-COS.
MET Srl, Judgment of 17 April 2007, n.y.r. in the ECR. This case concerned state liability as a result of 
conduct of state officials.
11  Cf. on direct effect in the perspective of minimum harmonisation: Jans, J. H., and J.M. Prinssen, ‘Direct 
Effect: Convergence or Divergence? A Comparative Perspective’ in Prinssen, J.M., and A. Schrauwen 
(eds.) Direct Effect; Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2002) 
at pp. 122 et seq. in particular.
12  Case C-511/03 Ten Kate [2005] ECR I-8979, paragraph 31 in particular.
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assessed in the light of the general criteria of Belgian civil liability law, which 
were wider than those of Community law.13 
As regards Spain, the judgment of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) in 
the CSD case is relevant.14 This case concerned the liability of Spain for legisla-
tion concerning satellite television decoders. In a preliminary reference, the 
Court of Justice held this legislation to be incompatible with the rules on the 
free movement of goods.15 According to the Tribunal Supremo: 
‘[…] the principle of state liability must always be interpreted extensiely so as to 
faour the protection of the indiidual against the actions of the state. This inter-
pretation deries on the one hand from the objectie character of such liability 
under internal law and on the other hand from the fact that it is a means of miti-
gating the deficiencies of other channels of protection of these interests. It would 
not be reasonable to reduce the indiidual’s right to effectie judicial protection to 
the benefit of the infringing state. The pro-indiidual interpretation of state liability 
can be inferred from the fact that the conditions set out by the Court of Justice do 
not prejudice the application of any less restrictie national rules. This is particu-
larly important in the sphere of our national legal system, in which the institute of 
state liability is of an objectie nature. It is therefore sufficient to be in presence of 
an indiidualised, illegal harm and of a causal link between the infringing act and 
the harm to engender this state liability.’16
In view of this, we must accept that extending the Francovich-concept remedies 
other than just damages on the basis of national law is also allowed, as it is to 
extend the doctrine to liability for lawful acts17 as well as establishing a system of 
personal liability for state officials.18
The reason for accepting more lenient liability conditions based on national 
law is, of course, an obvious one. More lenient conditions will ensure a more 
effective application of European rules in the national legal order.
13  Belgian Court of Cassation, No. C.98.0477F. Reported in European Communities ‘XVIIIth Report on 
Monitoring the Application of Community Law’ COM(2001) 309.
14  Sentence of the Tribunal Supremo (12/06/2003) on the Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital SL v. 
Administracion General del Estado [2002] ECR I-607, as reported by Martínez Lage, S. and H. Brokel-
mann ‘The Liability of the Spanish State for Breach of EC Law: The Landmark Ruling of the Spanish 
Tribunal Supremo in the CanalSatelite Digital Case’ EL Rev 2004, 29, p. 530.
15  Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607.
16  Use has been made of the English translation of the judgment as published in the EL Rev 2004, 29, p. 
530.
17  Cf. on the matter of Community liability to pay damages for lawful acts Case C-237/98 P Dorsch Consult 
[2000] ECR I-4549.





 4 Applying the principle and its conditions
The next question therefore is who decides whether the condi-
tions for Francovich-liability are met or not? In Köbler, the Court ruled that it 
is, in principle, for the national courts to apply the criteria for establishing the 
liability of Member States for damage caused to individuals by breaches of Com-
munity law, in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Court for the 
application of those criteria.19 Let us therefore have a look to see if this general 
statement of the ECJ is supported by its case law.
 4.1 Serious breach
According to the Court in Brasserie it is the ‘sole jurisdiction’ 
jurisdiction for the national courts as to how to characterize the breaches of 
Community law at issue and the ECJ cannot substitute its assessment for that 
of the national courts.20 In Haim, the Court added that in order to determine 
whether such an infringement of Community law constitutes a sufficiently seri-
ous breach, a national court hearing a claim for reparation must take account of 
all the factors which characterise the situation put before it and in accordance 
with the guidelines laid down by the Court.21
The ECJ is indeed willing to provide the national courts the necessary guid-
ance22 on which ‘factors’ they may take into consideration. They include:
• the clarity and precision of the rule breached;
•  the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or Community 
authorities;
•  whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or 
involuntary;
• whether the breach was excusable or not;
• whether a Community institution contributed towards the omission; and
•  the adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to 
Community law.
Having stated the sole jurisdiction for the national courts to decide if, in the 
circumstances of the case, the breach has to be regarded as serious or not, the 
Court will not hesitate to be helpful. In Brasserie, the Court made it perfectly 
19  Ibid., paragraph 100. 
20  Ibid., paragraph 58 of the judgment. Cf. also Case C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099 where the Court 
ruled that it is in principle for the national courts to assess whether a breach of Community law is suffi-
ciently serious for a Member State to incur non-contractual liability vis-à-vis an individual (paragraph 
59) and C-224/01 Köbler v. Austrian Republic [2003] ECR I-10239 where the Court ruled that in order to 
determine whether the infringement is sufficiently serious […], the competent national court, […], must 
determine whether that infringement is manifest.
21  Case C-424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I-5123, paragraph 42-44.
22  Cf. also Haim, paragraph 44 and Konle, paragraph 58 (as cited above).
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clear that as regards the provisions of the German Biersteuergesetz relating to 
the designation of ‘Bier’, it would be difficult to regard the breach of Article 28 
as an excusable error, since the incompatibility of such rules with Article 30 
was manifest in the light of earlier decisions of the Court. On the other hand, 
however, the criteria available to the national legislature to determine whether 
the prohibition of the use of additives was contrary to Community law were 
significantly less conclusive. It is difficult to see any national court exercising its 
‘sole jurisdiction’ and to come to opposite conclusions!
Sometimes however, the Court goes even further than in Brasserie and does 
not hesitate to apply the conditions itself. For instance in Brinkmann, the court 
ruled that in this instance the Court has all the information necessary in order 
to judge whether the facts presented are to be characterised as a sufficiently seri-
ous breach of Community law and, if appropriate, whether there is a causal link 
between the breach of the State’s obligation and the damage sustained.23
Indeed, it is ‘in principle’ up to the national court to determine whether the 
conditions for Francovich-liability are met or not. However, Brinkmann and Brit-
ish Telecom show that this is not a matter ‘of principle’!
 4.2 Rights for individuals
It is, in the author’s opinion, quite clear that to qualify a rule of 
European law in terms of ‘rights for individuals’ is as such a matter of (inter-
pretation of) European law in which the Member States and their courts, at the 
end of the day, do not have any discretion whatsoever. The rule infringed by the 
Member State contains ‘rights for individuals’ or not. Also the question who is 
in abstracto entitled to those rights is a question of interpretation of European 
law. However, it is for the national court to decide if the litigant in question falls 
within the protective scope of the European rule infringed.
For instance: in Brasserie, the Court ruled that Article 28 EC satisfies this 
condition and it must be assumed that all internal market-freedoms give rise to 
rights for individuals which the national courts must protect. In Dillenkofer the 
ECJ ruled that Article 7 Directive 90/314 entails the grant to package travellers 
of rights guaranteeing the refund of money that they have paid over and their 
repatriation in the event of the organizer’s insolvency. By contrast, in Peter Paul, 
the Court ruled that the European Banking directives do not contain explicit 
provisions conferring rights on depositors in the event their deposits became 
unavailable as a result of defective supervision and that these directives cannot 
be regarded as conferring on individuals rights capable of giving rise to state 
liability on the basis of Community law.
23  Case C-319/96 Brinkmann Tabakfabriken v. Skatteministeriet [1998] ECR I-5255, paragraph 26. Cf. also 
Case C-392/93  The Queen/H.M. Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I-1631 , para-
graph 41. Cf. also Case C-470/03 A.G.M.-COS.MET Srl, Judgment of 17 April 2007, n.y.r. in the ECR, 
where the Court ruled that the obligations set out in Article 4(1) of Directive 98/37 give the Member 




However, this does not necessarily mean that the role of national courts in 
applying the ‘rights for individuals’ condition is a limited one. Lower courts in 
particular will have to apply this condition without guidance of the Court of 
Justice. The danger of diverging case law is a real one. 
We may point at a recent judgment of the Dutch Gerechtshof Den Haag (The 
Hague appeal court) concerning Article 5 in combination with Annex III of the 
Nitrate Directive (91/676).24 Under this provision, Member States must establish 
and implement action programmes to reduce and prevent pollution caused by 
nitrates. The measures to be included in the action programmes must ensure 
that the amount of livestock manure applied to the land each year does not 
exceed 170 kg per hectare. In the view of the Gerechtshof, these provisions were 
not intended to confer rights on individuals, on the basis of which individuals 
could hold the state liable for the cost of purifying ground and surface water, or 
the cost of alternative drinking water. It held that the directive did not lay down 
the obligation to guarantee a particular quality of water, upon which individuals 
could base quality entitlements as against the state. 
This judgment seems to be at odds with a decision of the French Tribunal 
administratif (administrative court) at Rennes.25 In 1995, the Tribunal d’instance 
(district court) at Guincamp had ordered the Société Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux to 
pay compensation to 176 subscribers to its drinking water distribution network 
on account of the excessive nitrate content of the water it distributed. The Société 
accordingly brought proceedings before the Tribunal administratif to obtain 
compensation for the State’s late transposal of Article 5 of Directive 91/676. The 
Tribunal accepted this argument and concluded that the state was liable.
In my opinion, there are two main causes for any divergent case law at 
national level. The first one is that the case law of the ECJ on this condition is 
not always predictable, has an ad hoc character and it looks as if the Court’s case 
law is still developing. The second one has to do with similar, but not identical, 
concepts in national liability law, like Schutznorm in Germany and the ‘relativ-
ity-principle’ in Dutch law. It is quite natural for national courts to apply these 
doctrines also with respect to Francovich-claims.
 4.3 Causality
The third condition that must be fulfilled before a Member 
State can be held liable is that there must be a direct causal link between the 
breach and the damage suffered. However, it is not clear to what extent this 
requirement can and may be interpreted along national law lines. With a refer-
ence to Brasserie, I would like to submit that a national, more stringent causal-
ity than the requirement of ‘a direct causal link’ would question the right on 
24  Dutch Court of Appeal Den Haag 27 October 2005, M&R 2006, 1, nr. 4.
25  Société Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, req. No. 97182 [2001] Tribunal administratif Rennes. Reported in the 
Commission of the European Communities ‘XIXth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of 
Community Law’ COM(2002) 324.
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reparation itself. The problem however, is that it is not quite clear what the exact 
meaning is of ‘a direct causal link’. One cannot say that there is a fully devel-
oped European doctrine on causality.
It is clear from Brasserie du Pêcheur and subsequent case law that it is for the 
national courts to determine whether there is a causal link in a given case.26 In 
Norbrook Laboratories,27 the decision was explicitly left to the national court. This 
is indeed a textbook approach.
There are, however, cases where the ECJ decided the question of causality 
itself. In Brinkmann Tabakfabriken, for example, the Court held that there was 
no direct causal link between the breach and the damage.28 In Rechberger,29 the 
national court had already found that there was a causal link, but the Court of 
Justice nevertheless expressed a concurring opinion. As yet, the Court’s case law 
does not seem to have established a constant line and further decisions will have 
to be awaited.
There is very little reported national case law on the requirement of a direct 
causal link. In Re Burns’s Application for Judicial Review,30 the claimant, under 
threat of redundancy, had agreed to work on a night shift and subsequently 
asked to be transferred to a day shift. When her employer refused, she resigned 
on medical grounds. Having established that the claimant was to be regarded 
as a night worker, the High Court decided that failure to transpose Directive 
93/104 on the organisation of working time automatically constituted a seri-
ous breach of Community law, with the result that the United Kingdom had a 
duty to compensate the claimant for any resulting injury. In the instant case, 
however, she had not established that she would have been able to force her 
employer to transfer her to day work and thus keep her job if she had been 
able to rely on provisions transposing the rights conferred by the directive into 
national law. 
The issue of causation was also considered in another UK case.31 There, the 
Court of Appeal ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to be compensated for a 
lost chance.
26  Brasserie, paragraph 65: ‘it is for the national courts to determine whether there is a direct causal 
link between the breach of the obligation borne by the State and the damage sustained by the injured 
parties’. Cf. also Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553 (paragraph 30).
27 Case C-127/95 Norbrook Laboratories [1998] ECR I-1531, paragraph 110.
28 Case C-319/96 Brinkmann Tabakfabriken [1998] ECR I-5255.
29 Case C-140/97 Rechberger [1999] ECR I-3499, paragraphs 73 et seq.
30  High Court (Northern Ireland), 15 March 1999, NI 1999, p. 175. Reported in the Commission of the 
European Communities ‘XVIIth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law’ 
COM(2000) 92.




 4.4 Summing up
The general statement by the ECJ in its case law that it is, in 
principle, for the national courts to apply the criteria for establishing the liability 
of Member States for damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community 
law may be correct. However, for a good understanding of the case law, it is 
necessary to make a distinction between the conditions ‘serious breach’ and 
‘causal link’ on the one hand and ‘rights for individuals’ on the other. Assessing 
a breach as being ‘serious’ or not is a matter of applying the law; the same can be 
said with respect to assessing if there is a causal link or not.
Whether the rule infringed contains ‘rights for individuals’ is more a matter 
of interpreting then of applying European law. And, therefore it is ultimately the 
ECJ who has to decide on this issue. For the national court it only has to decide 
whether the plaintiff in question falls within the protective scope (as defined by 
European law) of the rule infringed.
 5 Applying procedural rules
The rulings of the Court in cases like Rewe/Comet make clear 
that some national differences are to be considered inherent in Community 
law.32 In the absence of specific Community rules, it is for the Member States to 
determine the competent courts and applicable procedural rules for legal pro-
ceedings relevant to the enforcement of Community law. The two well-known 
basic conditions of the so-called Rewe-test are that these rules may not be less 
favourable than those relating to similar ‘domestic’ remedies (principle of non-
discrimination) and that these rules may not make the exercise of Community 
rights virtually impossible or excessively difficult (principle of effectiveness). It 
must be acknowledged that the case law of the ECJ in Rewe/Comet implies the 
legitimacy of national differences concerning the modalities of applying the 
direct effect doctrine. In the light of this case law, it is not surprising at all that 
the Court ruled in Francovich that: 
‘it is for the internal legal order of each Member State to designate the competent 
courts and lay down the detailed procedural rules for legal proceedings intended 
fully to safeguard the rights which indiiduals derie from Community law’ (para-
graph 42).33 
Obviously, it is the Court’s opinion that applying national procedural law is not 
in violation of the principle of full effectiveness. At least, not as a matter of prin-
ciple, because the Court follows with the well known statement, that: 
32   Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR I-2043 and Case 265/78 Ferwerda 
[1980] ECR 716.




‘the substantie34 and procedural conditions for reparation of loss and damage 
laid down by the national law of the Member States must not be less faourable 
than those relating to similar domestic claims and must not be so framed as to 
make it irtually impossible or excessiely difficult to obtain reparation’ (paragraph 
43). 
With this the ECJ accepts that applying the doctrine of state liability may differ 
from one Member State to the next35 as long as these differences in national law 
fall within the scope of ‘not virtually impossible or excessively difficult’. Let us 
therefore have a look at what kind of differences are acceptable or not. 
 5.1 The qualification of the remedy according national law
National procedural law can be regarded as ‘the vehicle’ used to 
apply the Francovich-doctrine. Therefore, it is not unimportant how to qualify, in 
the context of national liability law, a Francovich-based claim. In some Member 
States, the applicable national procedural rules are dependant on the qualifica-
tion of such a claim. 
In England, for instance, it is established case law to regard liability for 
breach of Community law as ‘a breach of statutory duty’.36 For the scope of 
reparation, it does make a difference if the claim is based on negligence or as a 
breach of statutory duty.37 
In Germany, however, legal theorists have great difficulty specifying the 
precise nature of liability for breach of Community law in national law terms. A 
decision of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court) even gives rise to the suspicion 
that this liability must, to a certain extent, be regarded as a ‘separate’ matter 
from the ‘ordinary’ law on unlawful acts by public authorities. 
National limitation periods within which actions for reparation must be 
brought, in principle, also can be applied ‘normally’, in other words, subject 
to the requirements of non-discrimination and effectiveness. This is another 
reason why it is very important to determine how an action for reparation based 
on the Francovich doctrine is classified. In one of the follow-up decisions after 
Factortame, an English court had to decide whether or not an infringement of 
the EC Treaty, in conjunction with the European Communities Act 1972, should 
34  To the present author, it is not quite clear what the ECJ exactly means with ‘substantive’ provisions. 
35  Cf. also van Gerven, W., ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’, [2000] CML Rev, p. 501, in particular at 
pp. 504-505, who makes it perfectly clear that the requirement of ‘uniform application’ of Community 
does not preclude all national differences.
36  Cf. Phonographic Performance Limited v. Department of Trade and Industry and Another [2004] 3 CMLR 31. 
37  See also the Opinion of AG Tesauro in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and 




be classified as a breach of statutory duty. This classification would also deter-
mine what period of limitation would apply, six years or twelve.38 
 5.2 Extent of the reparation
In Brasserie, the Court ruled that in the absence of relevant 
Community provisions, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, 
subject to Rewe/Comet, to set the criteria for determining the extent of repara-
tion. This reparation must be commensurate with the loss or damage sustained 
so as to ensure the effective protection for their rights, according to the ECJ 
Brasserie du Pêcheur & Factortame. 
In particular, in order to determine the loss or damage for which repara-
tion may be granted, the national court may inquire whether the injured person 
showed reasonable diligence in order to avoid the loss or damage or limit its 
extent and whether, in particular, he availed himself in time of all the legal 
remedies available to him.39 
Indeed, it is a general principle common to the legal systems of the Member 
States that the injured party must show reasonable diligence in limiting the 
extent of the loss or damage, or risk having to bear the damage himself. In prin-
ciple, this is to be decided on the basis of national law. On the other hand, the 
Court makes it quite clear that not every limitation will be acceptable.
In Brasserie, the Court also ruled that as for the various heads of damage are 
concerned, Community law imposes no specific criteria. It is for the national 
court to rule on those heads of damage in accordance with the domestic law 
which it applies.40 In Brasserie, the ECJ ruled also that substantive and proce-
dural conditions laid down by national law on reparation of damage are able to 
take account of the requirements of the principle of legal certainty. With respect 
to the question of interest, the ECJ refers to national law: the Sutton-case41 shows 
that: 
‘it has been settled law that, while the right to reparation is founded directly on 
Community law where the three conditions set out aboe are fulfilled, the national 
law on liability proides the framework within which the State must make repara-
tion for the consequences of the loss and damage caused, proided always that 
the conditions laid down by national law relating to reparation of loss and damage 
must not be less faourable than those relating to similar domestic claims and 
38  R v. Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd and others (No. 7) [2001] High Court of 
Justice (England and Wales, QBD (Technology and Construction Court) 1 WLR 942, [2001] CMLR 1, p. 
1191.
39  Ibid., paragraps 83-85.
40  Ibid., paragraph 88.
41  Case C-66/95 Sutton [1997] ECR I-2163. Cf. also R v. Department of Social Security, ex parte Scullion 
[1999] High Court (England and Wales) [1999] CMLR 3, p. 798. See however Joined Cases C-397/98 and 
C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft [2001] ECR I-1727, paragraph 93-95.
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must not be so framed as to make it irtually impossible or excessiely difficult to 
obtain reparation’.
 5.3 How to allocate liability internally
The Court had already said in as many words in Brasserie du 
Pêcheur that the principle of state liability for damage caused to individuals as a 
result of breaches of Community law holds good ‘whatever be the organ of the 
State’. It was thus clear that breaches of Community law by municipalities, prov-
inces, Länder and other subnational authorities, autonomous or otherwise, may 
give rise to liability. Later decisions confirmed this conclusion.42 This raises the 
question of what the relationship is between liability of the State and liability of 
subnational authorities. According to the Court, this question is governed not by 
Community law, but primarily by national law. In Haim II,43 the Court ruled:
‘that Community law does not preclude a public-law body, in addition to the 
Member State itself, from being liable to make reparation for loss and damage 
caused to indiiduals as a result of measures which it took in breach of Commu-
nity law.’ 
This observation answers the question: is it always the state that has to make 
reparation? The answer is: no, not necessarily, as long as the injured party 
obtains reparation for his loss and damage. In other words, it is the result that 
counts: if a public authority has infringed Community law, the individual that 
has suffered damage as a result must be able to obtain reparation. How that 
result is achieved is apparently less interesting from a Community law point of 
view, as could already be implied from the Konle judgment.44 
 5.4 Violating the Rewe/Comet rule of effectiveness
There are only few examples where the ECJ found that national 
law violated the principle of effectiveness. In Brasserie (paragraph 71), the ECJ 
ruled on the condition imposed by German law where a law is in breach of 
higher-ranking national provisions, which makes reparation dependent upon 
the legislature’s act or omission being referable to an individual situation. This 
would in practice make it impossible or extremely difficult to obtain effective 
reparation for loss or damage resulting from a breach of Community law, since 
the tasks falling to the national legislature relate, in principle, to the public 
at large and not to identifiable persons or classes of person. Also, in Brasserie 
(paragraph 73) the Court ruled on the condition imposed by English law on state 
42  Case C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099 as regards regional authorities and Case C-424/97 Haim 
[2000] ECR I-5123 as regards independent public-law authorities.
43 Case C-424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I-5123.




liability requiring proof of misfeasance in public office. Such an abuse of power 
being inconceivable in the case of the legislature is also such as in practice to 
make it impossible or extremely difficult to obtain effective reparation for loss or 
damage resulting from a breach of Community law where the breach is attribut-
able to the national legislature. This case law in particular illustrates that there 
is a fine line between questioning the principle of state liability and its condi-
tions as such (a priori not acceptable) and national procedural rules governing 
claims for reparation (prima facie acceptable).
 6 Concluding remarks
In the introduction, I argued that it is a principle of Community 
law that the Member States are obliged to make good on losses and damages 
caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held 
responsible. And, that it is for the national legal order to designate the compe-
tent courts and lay down the procedural rules for the relevant legal proceedings.
The case law presented in this paper show that is not as simple as that. I 
would like to submit that an action for Francovich-liability is very much a mixed 
European/national type of remedy. 
The ‘European’ part of the remedy rest on the following two pillars:
•  national law affecting the scope of Francovich-liability ‘as such’ cannot be 
accepted. In other words, there is no room at all for the Member States to 
limit the scope of liability, for instance, by excluding certain measures/
actions of the national judiciary and/or the constitutional legislator;
•  imposing supplementary conditions for liability by national law are not 
acceptable, as this would call the right to reparation itself in question.
The ‘national’ part of the remedy rest on the following:
•  it is for the national courts to apply the criteria for establishing the liabil-
ity of Member States for damage caused to individuals by breaches of 
Community law;
•  it is for the national legal order of the Member States to designate the 
competent courts and lay down the detailed procedural rules for legal 
proceedings intended fully to safeguard the rights which individuals 
derive from Community law.
Mixed elements are illustrated by the following:
•  lowering the standards for liability on the basis of national law is fully 
acceptable;
•  extending the Francovich-concept to other remedies than just damages on 
the basis of national law is also allowed;
•  although it is ‘in principle’ to the national court to determine whether the 
conditions for Francovich-liability are met or not, case law shows that this 
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is not a matter ‘of principle’. The ECJ, if it feels necessary to do so, does 
not refrain from applying the conditions itself;
•  whether the rule infringed contains ‘rights for individuals‘ is more a 
matter of interpreting then of applying European law. And, therefore, it is 
ultimately the ECJ who has to decide on this issue;
•  there is an inherent danger that national courts, lower courts in particu-
lar, involved in applying Community-defined concepts on state liability 
will, in absence of guidance by the ECJ, be tempted to have recourse to 
similar concepts (e.g. on causation and Schutznorm) in national law;
•  there is a thin line between questioning the principle of state liability and 
its conditions as such (a priori not acceptable) and national procedural 
rules governing claims for reparation (prima facie acceptable). 
